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NATIVE-BORN ACADIANS AND THE EQUALITY IDEAL
Introduction
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (the Act) of 1964 makes it unlawful
for employers' "Itlo fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's ... national origin."' 2 Part I of this article will
attempt to define the status of the native-born Acadian employee under
this section by analyzing the statute's legislative history, judicial inter-
pretations and administrative guidelines.
Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 18661 guarantees "[a]ll
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States . . . the same right
... to make and enforce contracts . .. and to the full and equal
benefits of all laws . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens." Part II of
this article will review the history of Section 1981 and explore whether
that statute protects native-born Acadians or other "white" ethnic group
members in light of the inconsistent interpretations given it by the lower
federal courts.
The equal protection clause4 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution proscribes the denial by a state "Itlo any
person within its jurisdiction [of] the equal protection of the laws."
Part III will examine the United States Supreme Court's application of
the equal protection clause to claims of discrimination based on national
origin, and will discuss the prerequisites of "state action" and "pur-
Copyright 1986, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* The author wishes to dedicate this article to his uncle, former Congressman James
Domengeaux, Chairman of the Council for the Development of French in Louisiana. The
author also wishes to acknowledge the guidance of Paul R. Baier, Professor of Law, Paul
M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University, Judicial Fellow, Supreme Court of the
United States, 1975-1976.
1. For purposes of the Act, "Employer" means a person engaged in an industry af-
fecting commerce, who has fifteen or more employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976); cf. La.
R.S. 23:1006 (1983) (Intentional Discrimination in Employment Act). For purposes of Title
Vii, "employment agencies" and "labor organizations" have the same status as an "em-
ployer."
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1976).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
4. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
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poseful discrimination" necessary to assert a claim under the equal
,protection clause. This analysis will then be applied to a hypothetical
claim of class-based discrimination raised by a native-born Acadian.
Finally, Part IV examines the Acadian's rights to individual dignity
and cultural expression under the Louisiana Constitution of 1974. To
give the reader an idea of the forms of official discrimination that have
been waged against Acadians in the past, an analysis of the early
constitutions is discussed.
This article suggests the following. First, Acadians are entitled to
"national origin" protection under Title VII in light of the legislative
history and judicial and administrative interpretations of the Act; second,
Section 1981, in view of its historical setting, the protection it affords
to "whites" and aliens, and the ambiguous interpretations of "race,"
should provide native-born Acadians protection against invidious class-
based discrimination; third, the equal protection clause was adopted to
cure the evils of intentional discrimination against people on the basis
of certain "suspect" classifications such as "race" and "national ori-
gin." As a result, purposeful discrimination directed against Acadians
which can fairly be attributed to the state will subject such conduct to
the highest form of judicial scrutiny and render the conduct unconsti-
tutional. Finally, under the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 and various
Louisiana statutes, Acadians are afforded every opportunity to fully
develop their cultural heritage and are entitled to protection from ar-
bitrary and capricious governmental classifications.
Preface
Currently, approximately 800,000 Acadians reside in south Louisiana
and another 20,000 live in the New England states.' The Acadians are
unified by a loyal adherence to their religion, family life, language, and
fun-loving customs. Nevertheless, any sociological attempts to strictly
categorize the Acadian will meet with frustration. He is as diverse in
his political ideologies, economic status, and employment affiliations as
any other ethnic or national origin group in America. Since the migration
of the Acadians to America from present day Nova Scotia over two
hundred years ago, this group has adhered to a diligent work ethic,
code of honor and celebration of life.
The Acadians and "Le Grand Derangement"
In the early seventeenth century, following the practice of the major
European empires, France established a North American colony in Acadie
5. 1980 estimated figures. S. Thernstrom, Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic
Groups I. (1980). [hereinafter cited as ThernstromJ. The problem with accurately tracing
the true census accounting of "white" ethnic groups such as Acadians is that the census
does not document an American's "national origin" unless he is "Spanish surnamed."
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or Acadia, a region which consisted of present day Nova Scotia, New
Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, and part of the state of Maine. 6
Inhabitants from northwest and central France were recruited to help
settle and develop the land. These new frontiersmen diligently and suc-
cessfully established a prosperous area. The new settlers primarily co-
existed in a rural community life.
Throughout the years, the Acadians developed their own customs
and lifestyle which brought on a feeling of pride and solidarity:
Over time, just as English settlers and pioneers came to think
of themselves as Americans, the Acadians began to consider
themselves as a people distinct and apart from their fellow
Frenchmen. They ... had come under English rule in 1713 as
a result of the treaty of Utrecht that ended one of several
French-English wars. At the time they were directed to withdraw
into French territory or to swear unconditional loyalty to the
English monarch, but apparently they did neither and continued
to prosper as before. 7
Under English domain, the Acadians did, however, sign conditional
oaths of allegiance to England with the understanding that they would
refuse to bear arms against France in the event of a military confron-
tation between England and France. They became known by the British
as "French Neutrals."8
As relations between England and France became more strained,
the English authorities feared that the Acadians posed a national security
risk because of their refusal to sign the unconditional oaths of allegiance
to the British crown. In 1755, after again refusing to sign the oaths,
the Acadians' properties were confiscated, their families were dispersed,
and groups were loaded on ships destined for the British colonies and
Europe. This mass movement became known as "Le Grand Derange-
ment"-The Great Displacement .
The Acadian Migration
The exile of 1755 brought many Acadians to the British colonies
in America, where they lived in poverty and were persecuted because
of their language and steadfast devotion to the Roman Catholic faith:
In Boston they were treated as slaves. New York's governor
persuaded them to emigrate to Santo Domingo, where, naked
6. Thernstrom, supra note 5, at 6.
7. Id. at 1. See also Roach v. Dresser Indus. Valve & Instrument Div., 494 F. Supp.
215 (W.D. La. 1980).
8. See Roach, 494 F. Supp. at 216.
9. Thernstrom, supra note 5, at I.
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and destitute, many of them perished. North and South Car-
olinians enticed some 2,000 of them to board leaky vessels to
return to Acadia, their homeland. Only 900 made it alive. Those
dumped in Georgia fled immediately, for they preferred death
to the slavery to which they would have been condemned. Des-
titute, mistreated, unwelcome, the miserable exiles found no
friendly government among these colonies, except in Connecticut,
where they were treated as human beings.' 0
Word spread that the Acadians would be well received in the Spanish
colony of Louisiana, which was still deeply French in its culture. In
1764, the first Acadians reached Louisiana, and by 1767, hundreds had
emigrated to south Louisiana."
By the time of the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, there was a constant
growth of Acadian settlements in south Louisiana. Many of the Acadians
continued to live as they did in Acadia as small proprietors. A substantial
number of the new settlers prospered as fishermen and trappers, and
in the Opelousas and Attakapas regions, many concentrated on raising
and selling cattle.' 2 .
The Acadian-American Experience
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Aca-
dians by and large lived in isolated rural areas, faithfully clinging to
their insular customs, French language and devotion to the Roman
Catholic church. The Acadians maintained large families, and by 1880,
their population rose to 270,000.1' Because of the Acadians' Catholic
practices in an area that was predominately Protestant, and because of
their preservation of their language and community, their Anglo neigh-
bors saw them as backward and ignorant. As a result, the Acadians
were ostracized and discriminated against throughout this period. ' 4
With the advancement of technology and education in the twentieth
century, the provincialism of the Acadians' lifestyle conflicted even more
with the rest of society. Innovations such as new roads and bridges,
motion pictures, and compulsory school attendance paved the way for
a sociological transition. 5 Educators barred the use of French in the
classrooms, and French-speaking pupils were severely disciplined for
10. Chandler, "In Search of a Friendly Land," Acadian Profile, Vol. 12, No. I, at
26 (1985).
i. Roach, 494 F. Supp. at 217.
12. Thernstrom, supra note 5, at I.
13. Id.
14. See Thernstrom, supra note 5, at 1.
15. Id.
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speaking French.sa The result was a practically irreversible psychological
scar which connected the speaking of French with ignorance and shame.
The long term result was that the language was nearly lost and the
solidarity of a culture severely tested.
The Acadian Revival
During the post-World War II era, many Acadians experienced
occupational and geographic mobility. The blossoming of the oil and
gas industries in Louisiana offered alternatives to the primarily rural
existence of the Acadian people. This new prosperity brought an op-
portunity for the Acadian to fully integrate into the American socio-
economic pattern. In 1968, the Council for the Development of French
in Louisiana (CODOFIL) was created. CODOFIL, a state agency, rep-
resented an official endorsement of what later became known as the
Louisiana French renaissance movement.' 6 CODOFIL has been credited
with successfully implementing the teaching of French in elementary and
high school curriculums and reawakening the conscience of a proud
people to whom the preservation of the French language and Acadian
culture is of paramount concern.
Currently, pride in the Acadian culture is soaring and the future
of the Acadian people is sound. One can feel this "born again" pride
by observing and conversing with Acadians in the many south Louisiana
cities and villages. The mood is upbeat and a dedication to preserve
the Acadian culture is intact. In no area is the dignity and wholesomeness
of the Acadian people as aptly reflected as in their music.'7 In the last
two decades, Acadian musicians have been invaluable in reinstating the
self esteem and pride of a once deflated people.
Discrimination Against Acadians in the Work Place
Although immense pride in the Acadian culture is prominent in the
eyes of the Acadian and his neighbor alike, and regardless of the
nationwide popularity of Acadian cuisine and celebrations, vestiges of
the stereotype of the Acadian as backward and illiterate persist. In many
instances, this prejudicial attitude has infiltrated the workplace.
As a result of post-World War II prosperity in Louisiana, large
influxes of non-Louisianians found their way to "Acadiana."' 8 Most of
these newcomers quickly embraced the Acadian way of life. Nevertheless,
151. "The New Louisiana Story," 120 Cong. Rec. 5417, 5418 (March 5, 1974).
16. B. Ancelet and E. Morgan, Jr., The Makers of Cajun Music 31 (1984).
17. For an excellent account of the history and current status of Acadian music, see
Ancelet and Morgan, id.
18. "Acadiana" is the popular name for 22 parishes in southwest and central Louisiana
where the population is heavily represented by Acadians and French descendants.
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some of "Les Americains '"19 perpetuated the stereotypes commenced by
their Anglo-Saxon predecessors and thus produced a tainted atmosphere
in the work place. Much of the prejudice directed against Acadians is
religious in nature; however, a substantial amount is probably the result
of the image of the Acadian as an illiterate, shallow and self-indulgent
creature.
I. NATIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION AND THE
NATIVE-BORN ACADIAN UNDER TITLE VII
A. Legislative Intent of Title VII
In Griggs v. DukePower Co., 20 the Supreme Court paraphrased
the command of Title VII as follows: "What is required by Congress
is the removal of artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary barriers to em-
ployment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the
basis of racial or other impermissible classifications. ' 2 ' Title VII, enacted
in 1964, is broader than the Civil Rights legislation enacted in the
aftermath of the Civil War, as it explicitly covers classifications other
than racial groups. Employment practices which have a detrimental
impact or effect upon an individual because of his or her religion, 22
sex, 23 or national origin 4 are also proscribed.
In 1975, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals summed
up the laudable goal of Congress in enacting Title VII: "Equal em-
ployment opportunity may be secured only when employers are barred
from discriminating against employees on the basis of immutable char-
acteristics, such as race and national origin."2 5 The same court said in
1980: "[N]o one can change his place of birth (national origin), the
place of birth of his forbears (national origin), his race or fundamental
sexual characteristics. 2 6 That court has also stated: "[Title VII] should
be accorded a liberal interpretation in order to effectuate the purpose
of Congress to eliminate the inconvenience, unfairness, and humiliation
of ethnic discrimination., 2 7
19. "Les Americains" is a term commonly used by the older Acadians when referring
to their Anglo neighbors.
20. 401 U.S. 424, 91 S. Ct. 849 (1971).
21. Id. at 431, 91 S. Ct. at 893; see also Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S.
747, 96 S. Ct. 1251 (1976) (Congress' intent was to prohibit all practices which create in-
equality in employment due to race, religion, sex, or national origin classifications. Id. at
763, 96 S. Ct. at 1263.); cf. Caviale v. Wisconsin, 744 F.2d 1289, 1292-93 (7th Cir. 1984).
22. Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975).
23. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
24. See Saucedo v. Brothers Well Serv., Inc., 464 F. Supp. 919 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
25. Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc).
26. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 1980).
27. Rogers v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir.
1971).
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B. Definition of National Origin
There is little authority indicating what Congress intended when it
included "national origin" as a protected classification under Title VII.
In the hearings relevant to the passage of the Act, Congressman James
Roosevelt of California attempted to clear up some confusion with the
following statement: "May I just make very clear that 'national origin'
means national. It means the country from which your forbears came
from. You may come from Poland, Czechoslovakia, England, France,
or any other country." ' 28 Congressman Dent added: "[Nlational origin,
of course, has nothing to do with color, religion, or the race of an
individual. A man may have migrated from Great Britain and still be
a colored person.' '29
An earlier version of Title VII had referred to discrimination based
on "race, color, religion, national origin, or ancestry."' 3 Exclusion of
the word "ancestry," however, from the final version of the Act suggests
that the terms "national origin" and "ancestry" were considered syn-
onymous.3" Therefore, it is clear that Congress intended to include in
the term "national origin" groups of persons of common ancestry,
heritage or background.3 2
On December 29, 1980, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission33 promulgated a revision to its Guidelines on Discrimination
Because of National Origin,34 which substantially expanded the definition
of national origin discrimination." The basic definition is presently as
28. 110 Cong. Rec. 2549 (1964).
29. Id.
30. H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 804 (1963) (Comm. print). See also Espinoza
v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 89, 94 S. Ct. 334, 337 (1973).
31. H. R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 87 (1963). See also Espinoza, 414 U.S.
at 89, 94 S. Ct. at 337.
32. See B. Schlei & P. Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 305 (1983) [here-
inafter cited as Schlei & Grossman]; see also Note, Language Discrimination under Title
VII: The Silent Right of National Origin Discrimination, 15 J. Mar. L. Rev. 667 (1982);
cf. Thomas v. Rohner-Gehrig & Co., 582 F. Supp. 669, 679 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (Defendant
employer conceded that national origin discrimination encompasses a person's ancestry, her-
itage, and background for purposes of Title VII.).
33. The E.E.O.C., a federal administrative agency, from time to time issues guidelines
interpreting different aspects of Title VII. The administrative interpretation of Title VII by
the E.E.O.C. is entitled to great deference. United States v. Chicago, 400 U.S. 8, 91 S. Ct.
18 (1970). Furthermore, where Title VII and its legislative history support the E.E.O.C.'s
construction, the guidelines express the will of Congress. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 435, 91 S. Ct.
at 855.
34. 29 C.F.R. § 1606 (1985).
35. The general definition refers to "national origin discrimination" and is not limited
to "national origin"; see 3 A. Larson & L. Larson, Employment Discrimination § 93:20
at 20-23 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Larson]. Contra 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 421:751 (1978)
("Country of Birth").
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follows: "The Commission defines national origin discrimination broadly
as including, but not limited to, the denial of equal employment because
of an individual's, or his or her ancestor's, place of origin; or because
an individual has the physical, cultural or linguistic characteristics of a
national origin group." 6 The Commission made it clear in its public
comments accompanying the Guidelines17 that national origin discrimi-
nation was not limited to "country of origin." The Commission said:
Several commentators correctly noted that for an individual to
be protected against national origin [discrimination, it is not
necessary that the individual] 8 or his ancestors have their origin
in a sovereign nation. See, for example, Roach v. Dresser In-
dustries, 23 FED CASES 1073 (W.D. La. 1980), where the court
held that a person of Acadian descent ("Cajun") could sue
under Title VII for national origin discrimination. Because the
phrase "country of origin" may imply a reference to a sovereign
nation, it has been substituted by the phrase "place of origin." 3 9
The Commission was correct in delineating broadly national origin
discrimination. "Nation" and "Country," although used interchangeably
in many instances, are not synonymous.40 Futhermore, to fully incor-
porate Title VII's goal of maintaining a work place free of invidious
discrimination, it should be irrelevant whether an ethnic American's
ancestors were "loyal subjects of the Crown" in a sovereign country,
or rebellious farmers in a territorial province.
"National origin" protection under Title VII does not make it illegal
to discriminate against an individual on the basis of citizenship or
alienage. 41 Nevertheless, the E.E.O.C. and the courts have included
within the category of "national origin," members of all national groups
and groups of persons of common ancestry, heritage, or background.4 1
Some of the groups considered protected are Hungarians4 3 Slavics,"
36. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (1985); see also Larson and Larson, supra note 35, § 93:20 at
20-23.
37. 45 Fed. Reg. 85632 (1980).
38. A reading of this paragraph will reveal that an obvious typographical mistake was
made by the E.E.O.C. It is apparent that the bracketed language supplied is the correct
version.
39. 45 Fed. Reg. at 85633.
40. "'Nation' is defined as: 'a distinct race or people, characterized by common descent,
language or history, usually organized as a separate political state and occupying a definite
territory.' The Oxford Universal Dictionary, p. 1311." Larson and Larson, supra note 35,
at 20-4.
41. Espinoza, 414 U.S. 86, 94 S. Ct. 334.
42. See Schlei & Grossman, supra note 32, at 305.
43. Morvay v. Maghielse Tool & Die Co., 708 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1983); Fekete v. United
States Steel Corp., 424 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1970).
44. Sklenar v. Central Bd. of Educ., 497 F. Supp. 1154 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Budinsky
v. Corning Glass Works, 425 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
[Vol. 461158
COMMENTS
Arabs, 45 East Indians,46 Americans, 47 Hispanics of "Puerto Rican de-
scent,"' 48 New Zealanders,4 9 Pakistanis, ° Hawaiians," Native Alaskans, 2
and by implication, White Anglo-Saxon Protestants. 3
C. Roach v. Dresser Industries Valve & Insrument Division
Roach v. Dresser Industries Valve & Instrument Division 4 is the
only reported decision in which a native-born Acadian brought suit
under Title VII challenging an unlawful employment practice by his
employer because of his national origin. The plaintiff alleged that his
employment with Dresser Industries was terminated because of his na-
tional origin (Acadian) and his association with Acadian co-employees.
In particular, he alleged:
On March 31, 1977, plaintiff was terminated from his employ-
ment with defendant, Dresser Industries, Inc., because of his
national origin and his association with co-employees of the
same national origin, to-wit, Acadians or "Cajuns," and because
he objected to excessive and opprobrious derogatory comments
made by members of the management of defendant relating to
co-employees who were Acadian or "Cajuns" and to co-em-
ployees who were black."
The defendant demurred, insisting that since Acadia is not and never
was a sovereign nation, as a matter of law, plaintiff had no standing
under Title VII to bring the claim.' 6
Judge Hunter first addressed the issue of the proper definition of
an Acadian. The judge said:
Controversy, emotionalism and the import of Longfellow's
"Evangeline" have contributed to many stereotyped and over-
simplified characterizations of the Acadian people. In the context
45. Ibrahim v. New York State Dept. of Health, 581 F. Supp. 228 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
46. Sethy v. Alameda County Water Dist., 545 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1976); see also Schlei
& Grossman, supra note 32, at 305 n.9.
47. Earnhardt v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 744 F.2d I (Ist Cir. 1984); Bilka v.
Pepe's Inc., 601 F. Supp. 1254 (N.D. III. 1985); Thomas v. Rohner-Gehrig & Co., 582 F.
Supp. 669 (N.D. 111. 1984).
48. Garcia v. Gardner's Nurseries, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 369 (D. Conn. 1984).
49. Bell v. Home Life Ins. Co., 596 F. Supp. 1549 (M.D.N.C. 1984).
50. lftikhar v. Boorstin, 36 F.E.P. 1345 (April 4,1984).
51. 3 F.E.P. 390 (Mar. 1, 1971); see also Larson and Larson, supra note 35, at 20-
22.
52. Domingo v. New England Fish Co., 445 F. Supp. 421 (W.D. Wash. 1977).
53. Buck v. Board of Educ., 5 F.E.P. 519 (Dec. 15, 1972).
54. 494 F. Supp. 215 (W.D. La. 1980).
55. Roach, Civil Action No. 78-0157 (W.D. La. 1980).
56. 494 F. Supp. at 216.
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of this litigation we agree... that a "Cajun" is properly defined
as an Acadian, and that one is a "Cajun" only if his ancestry
includes someone who once lived in Acadia."
The judge also alluded in a footnote 8 that although many southwest
Louisianians consider themselves or are considered by others to be
Acadians, for purposes of "national origin" status under Title VII, a
party must be able to trace his roots to someone who once lived in
Acadia.59
In holding that the case would be heard on its merits, 60 and in
rejecting the defendant's contentions that since Acadia is not and never
was an independent, sovereign nation, it could not be Calvin Roach's6M
"national origin," the judge said: "Distinctions between citizens solely
because of their ancestors are odious to a free people whose institutions
are founded upon the doctrine of equality, and we decline to accept
the argument that litigation of this sort should be governed by the
principles of sovereignty. '62
The E.E.O.C. cited Roach approvingly in its Comments to its Guide-
lines on Discrimination Because of National Origin 63 for the proposition
that national origin is determined from a person's "place of origin"
and not limited to his "country of origin" (sovereignty).
D. "Mistaken" National Origin Discrimination in South Louisiana
The general E.E.O.C. definition discussed earlier is in two parts,
joined by the disjunctive "or." The first part of the definition regards
57. Id.
58. Id. at 216-17 n.l:
Many people living in Southwestern Louisiana consider themselves to be Cajuns
despite the fact they may not trace their ancestry to the colony of Acadia (Tr.
76, Hebert). Moreover, these people are considered by others to be Cajuns. Such
a definition transcends traditional boundaries such as national origin, which is
often the basis for formation of ethnic groups. It also stresses the openness so
characteristic of South Louisiana (Tr. 244, Joubert), but in the context of "national
origin" this definition may not be utilized in this litigation. In this latter category,
according to the testimony of Dr. Arceneaux and Mr. Domengeaux, is the Hon-
orable Edwin Edwards, who served as Governor of Louisiana from 1972-80.
59. Many Acadian descendants have ancestors who were not originally French, but
Anglo-Saxon. However, when these Anglo-Saxons integrated into the Acadian communities,
they took on the identity of the Acadian and became absorbed by the French influence and
spoke French. Furthermore, they considered themselves to be Acadians. See id. at 217.
60. The case was subsequently settled out of court in favor of Mr. Roach.
61. Although Mr. Roach spells his name in an Anglo fashion, his grandfather spelled
it in the French form - Roche. (Telephone interview with Roach's attorney, Daniel E. Brous-
sard, Jr., June 25, 1985).
62. 494 F. Supp. at 218.
63. See 45 Fed. Reg. 85632 (1980).
64. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (1985).
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the employee's actual ancestral origins. The second part addresses the
employer's subjective perceptions of the employee's national origin, based
on the employee's physical, cultural, and linguistic characteristics. 6 In
the Commission's view, it is enough that the aggrieved party's accent,
appearance or physical characteristics were the cause of differential
treatment, regardless of whether the discriminator knew the particular
national origin group to which the complainant belonged, for there to
be a violation of Title VII. 66
In Berke v. Ohio Department of Public Welfare,61 the plaintiff, Ms.
Berke, was born in Poland and eventually emigrated to the United
States. Although she was a registered nurse with an advanced degree in
communications, and her fluency in the English language was well above
average, the Ohio Department of Welfare denied Ms. Berke employment
because of her pronounced foreign accent. The sixth circuit affirmed
the unpublished district court opinion which had held that it was suf-
ficient that the employer treated her differently because she had a
"foreign accent," for there to have been improper discrimination.
Berke may be extended to protect the Acadian employee. Suppose
a well-educated Acadian with a noticable accent 68 gets a job in a state
where the inhabitants are unfamiliar with Acadians. If the Acadian
would be denied promotions or otherwise be treated differently by his
employers because of his Acadian accent, it would be immaterial whether
the employer knew the employee's national origin (Acadian).
"Mistaken" national origin discrimination may also arise with respect
to French-Americans from Avoyelles Parish, located in central Louisiana.
Many, but not all, of the French descendents from Avoyelles Parish
are not Acadians in the legal sense, 69 because their ancestors emigrated
to the United States and Louisiana from France and not Acadia or
Nova Scotia. Nevertheless, many of these same people have fully em-
braced and substantially contributed to the Acadian culture and cause,
and as a result, they maintain an Acadian accent. If an Avoyelles Parish
Frenchman were to be discriminated against by his employer because
he was thought to be an Acadian, under the E.E.O.C. Guidelines, the
employee would have standing under Title VII to bring an employment
discrimination action.
65. Larson and Larson, supra note 35 at 20-25.
66. 45 Fed. Reg. at 85633.
67. 628 F.2d 980 (6th Cir. 1977).
68. The Acadian accent, although not easy to describe in writing, has a well-defined
French influence in its delivery, and is primarily limited to the inhabitants of Louisiana.
It is a. source of pride for many Acadians, although with the great influence of nationwide
television, many Acadian children no longer maintain the accent.
69. See supra notes 58-59.
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The E.E.O.C. contends in the same Guidelines that protection from
"mistaken" national origin discrimination extends to those to whom the
following characteristics apply:
(a) Marriage to or association with persons of a national origin
group;
(b) Membership in, or association with an organization iden-
tified with or seeking to promote the interests of a national
origin group;
(c) Attendance or participation in schools, churches, temples
or mosques generally used by persons of a national origin group;
(d) Use of an individual's or spouse's name which is associated
with a national origin group.7 0
Hence, if a person of German or Jewish descent marries a Begnaud, 7
or is a member of CODOFIL, and can show that he or she has been
denied equal employment opportunities on account of his or her as-
sociation with the Acadian person or entity, and the reasons for the
caustic treatment are indeed discriminatory based on national origin, the
E.E.O.C. will "examine with particular concern" these charges by ap-
plying general Title VII principles, such as disparate treatment and
adverse impact.
E. Disparate Treatment Against Acadians and Problems of Proof
In order for an Acadian plaintiff to recover in an employment
discrimination suit, it is necessary that he show that the defendant "failed
or refused to hire or [discharged him] or otherwise [discriminated against
him] with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment because of [his] . . . national origin." 7 2
The two principal theories of employment discrimination developed
by the Supreme Court since the enactment of Title VII are disparate
treatment and adverse (or disparate) impact. Disparate treatment refers
to different treatment of an individual on account of some immutable
characteristic, such as race, sex, national origin, age or handicap. In
practice, "[tlhe usual disparate case is an individual case, and the focus
of the contest is on the employer's motivation for the different action
taken, with the plaintiff attempting to prove intentional bias and the
employer contending that its actions were based on a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason." 73 On the other hand, under the adverse impact
70. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (1985).
71. A prominent Acadian surname.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e - 2(a)(I) (1976).
73. Schlei & Grossman, supra note 32, at 1286.
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theory, focus lies upon the effects of the alleged discriminatory practice
rather than on the employer's motivation or intent. 74 As the Supreme
Court noted in Griggs: "Good intent or absence of discriminatory intent
does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that
operate as "built-in headwinds" for minority groups and are unrelated
to measuring job capability ... Congress directed the thrust of the Act
to the consequences of the employment practices, not simply the mo-
tivation."7
This section will provide a general analysis of the proof consider-
ations solely with respect to the theory of disparate treatment. Practically
speaking, the vast majority of actual or potentially discriminatory prac-
tices directed against Acadian laborers involve prejudicially motivated
actions by an employer against the employee rather than covert or neutral
company plans or policies which have an adverse impact upon Acadians
as a group.
In a disparate treatment suit, the ultimate issue is whether the
employer intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.76 Proof may
be by direct evidence of a discriminatory motive," or by indirect evidence
from which an inference of discriminatory motive may be drawn. 78 The
inference may be drawn from "comparative evidence demonstrating that
the treatment of the plaintiff differs from that accorded to otherwise
'similarly situated' individuals who are not within the plaintiff's protected
group." 79
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,80 the Supreme Court set
forth a framework for establishing a prima facie case of disparate
treatment. The model required that the plaintiff prove four elements:
(i) That he belongs to a class protected under Title VII;
(ii) That he applied and was qualified for a job for which
the employer was seeking applications;
(iii) That, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and
(iv) That, after his rejection, the position remained open and
the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of com-
plainant's qualifications. 8
74. Id. at 1287.
75. 401 U.S. at 432, 91 S. Ct. at 854.
76. Thornbrough v. Columbus & Greenville R.R., 760 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1985).
77. See Schlei & Grossman, supra note 32, at 1291.
78. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15, 975 S.
Ct. 1843, 1854 n.15 (1977).
79. Schlei & Grossman, supra note 32, at 1291.
80. 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973).
81. Id. at 802, 93 S. Ct. at 1824.
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Once an employee has established a prima facie case, the burden
of proof shifts to the employer:82 "In order to rebut the presumption
of intentional discrimination, the employer must articulate 'some legit-
imate, nondiscriminatory reason' why the plaintiff was rejected or some-
one else was preferred; otherwise, the factfinder is required to find for
the plaintiff. '8 3 The plaintiff, however, bears the ultimate burden of
proving discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.8 4
It must be stressed that an employee who charges his employer with
national origin discrimination must ultimately prove that the disparate
treatment was, in fact, discrimination, and was not based on some
legitimate business reason. Reasons which have been found nondiscri-
minatory include: "lesser comparative qualifications, attitude problems,
effeminism, personal differences with a supervisor or other employees,
lack of diligence, political considerations, budgetary constraints, and
instances of misconduct and disloyalty." '8 5
Even though the employer articulates legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for his actions, the plaintiff may still prevail by proving that
the "justification" was, in fact, a pretext for discrimination. In Thorn-
brough v. Columbus ,and Greenville R.R.,8 6 the fifth circuit delineated
this stage of the case by reliance on Supreme Court decisions. The court
said:
The burden of production ... shifts back to the plaintiff, albeit
at a "new level of specificity," to prove that the reasons ar-
ticulated by the employer are not true reasons but only pre-
texts .... The plaintiff can do this in two ways, [1] "either
directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason
more likely motivated the employer or [2] indirectly by showing
that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of cre-
dence." 7
Thus a three-stage process is mandated concerning the order and allo-
cation of proof. Nevertheless, a trifurcated trial is not contemplated.
The process merely provides a method of analyzing the evidence before
the court.88
82. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981);
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 98 S. Ct. 2943 (1978).
83. Thornbrough, 760 F.2d at 639; see also McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at
803, 93 S. Ct. at 1824-25 (1973).
84. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs, 450 U.S. at 254-56, 101 S. Ct. at 1094-
95.
85. Schlei & Grossman, supra note 32, at 1213-12 n.55-63.
86. 760 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1985).
87. Id. at 639, quoting Texas Dept. of Community Affairs, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.
Ct. at 1095.
88. See Schlei & Grossman, supra note 32, at 1321-22.
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F. "Speak English Only" Rules and the Bilingual Acadian
In the United States, many businesses require their employees to
speak only English on the job, unless they are communicating with
customers who choose to speak in a foreign language. Likely reasons
for such rules are business justifications such as safety and the fear
that English-speaking customers will be intimidated by the "foreign"
conversations. For the most part, Acadians in the work force are com-
petent in the English language, and communicating in English at work
is not a burdensome requirement. Nevertheless, bilingual older Acadians,
and younger Acadians striving to become bilingual, may be more com-
fortable or fulfilled when communicating in French.
This section will explore whether an employer can require bilingual
employees to speak only English on the job either at all times, or only
at certain times, as well as the requirements of proper notice of such
rules.
1. English required at all times
In Saucedo v. Brothers Well Service, Inc.,89 defendant had an in-
formal company "rule," unpublished and not well promulgated, that
prohibited employees from speaking Spanish while on the job. The
justification for the rule was that any failure of communication during
the drilling of an oil well could have disastrous consequences. Plaintiff
was discharged for speaking Spanish on the job when he replied to a
question by a fellow Spanish worker, even though a well was not being
drilled when he did so. The court found that the application of the
rule to the casual use of a Spanish phrase in the performance of a
routine task in a safe area was not justified by business necessity. For
that reason, and because the "rule" had a disparate impact on Mexican-
American employees, the court held that the discharge violated Title
VII's national origin discrimination provision.
In its Guidelines on National Origin Discrimination, the E.E.O.C.
has created a strong presumption against rules requiring the speaking
of English at all times. The provision states:
When applied at all times. A rule requiring employees to speak
only English at all times in the workplace is a burdensome term
and condition of employment. The primary language of an
individual is often an essential national origin characteristic.
Prohibiting employees at all times, in the workplace, from speak-
ing their primary language or the language they speak most
comfortably, disadvantages an individual's employment oppor-
89. 464 F. Supp. 919 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
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tunities on the basis of national origin. It may also create an
atmosphere of inferiority, isolation and intimidation based on
national origin which could result in a discriminatory working
environment. Therefore, the Commission will presume that such
a rule violates Title VII and will closely scrutinize it.9
Although Title VII does not equate national origin with the language
one chooses to speak, 9' language identification is extremely important
in adhering to one's national origin. Since the French language is the
nucleus of the Acadian people, any employment rule which severely
curtails the use of French by Acadians should be carefully scrutinized.
2. English Required Only at Certain Times
In Garcia v. Gloor, 92 the plaintiff was a Mexican-American fluent
in both English and Spanish, whose duties with the defendant included
stocking and sales. The defendant had a rule that prohibited employees
from speaking Spanish on the job unless they were communicating with
Spanish-speaking customers. The rule did not apply to manual laborers
who were not bilingual or to conversations during work breaks.
While away from business customers, the plaintiff was overheard
speaking Spanish with another employee and was subsequently dis-
charged. The issue presented was whether the defendant's rule, applied
only at certain times, imposed a discriminatory condition on plaintiff's
employment. In denying that Title VII commands employers to permit
employees to speak the tongue they prefer, the fifth circuit said:
The EEO Act does not support an interpretation that equates
the language an employee prefers to use with his national origin.
To a person who speaks only one tongue or to a person who
has difficulty using another language than the one spoken in
his home, language might well be an immutable characteristic
like skin color, sex, or place of birth. However, the language
a person who is multi-lingual elects to speak at a particular time
is by definition a matter of choice. 93
The court concluded that there was a valid, non-discriminatory reason
for the rule as applied, and that no basis for a national origin discrim-
ination suit existed. The E.E.O.C. has tailored its rule to conform to
Garcia: "An employer may have a rule requiring that employees speak
only in English at certain times where the employers can show that the
rule is justified by business necessity." '94
90. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (1985).
91. See Garcia, 618 F.2d at 268.
92. 618 F.2d 264.
93. Id. at 270.
94. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(b) (1980).
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Except for a "Speak English Only" rule applicable in "danger areas"
in the workplace, or in the case of bilingual employees who refuse to
converse with unilingual co-workers or customers in English, the writer
finds these discriminatory workplace rules to be unreasonable. Further-
more, the writer strongly disagrees with the court's analysis in Garcia.
In a country where there are less students of the Russian language than
there are English teachers in the Soviet Union and whose diplomatic
channels of communication with foreign nations are in a dismal state
for want of competent American interpreters, a reasonable person might
challenge the wisdom of Garcia. Furthermore, the very nature of a
"Sjeak English Only" rule (except in safety circumstances) reeks of
xenophobia and misplaced "Americanization." No one can doubt that
the true intent of such a rule is to discourage the practice by new
immigrants of speaking their native tongue. Hector Garcia was certainly
not fired because he upset customers by speaking Spanish-he was not
within hearing distance of any customers. Garcia was wrongfully dis-
charged because he practiced his native tongue. Such a situation un-
fortunately parallels the "Americanization" process in Louisiana in the
early twentieth century when educators, both Anglo and Acadians, se-
verely whipped and scorned Acadian boys and girls for speaking French
in the classroom and schoolyards. 91 Unfortunately, Garcia impresses a
judicial imprimatur on blatant national origin discrimination. Language
is the lifeblood of every ethnic group. To economically and psycholog-
ically penalize a person for practicing his native tongue is to strike at
the core of ethnicity.
3. Notice of the Rules
The E.E.O.C. had formulated the following guidelines concerning the
need for adequate notice of a "Speak English Only" rule:
Notice of the rule. It is common for individuals whose primary
language is not English to inadvertently change from speaking
English to speaking their primary language. Therefore, if an
employer believes it has a business necessity for a speak-English-
only rule at certain times, the employer should inform its em-
ployees of the general circumstances when speaking only in
English is required and of the consequences of violating the
rule. If an employer fails to effectively notify its employees of
the rule and makes an adverse employment decision against an
individual based on a violation of the rule, the Commission will
consider the employer's application of the rule as evidence of
discrimination on the basis of national origin.96
95. "The New Louisiana Story," 120 Cong. Rec. 5417, 5418 (March 5, 1974).
96. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(c) (1980).
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This notice requirement may serve to alleviate some of the harshness
of the "informal house rules" on speaking only English in the work
place.
G. National Origin Harrassment and the Native Born Acadian in
the Workplace
It is an unlawful employment practice under Title VII "to discrim-
inate against any individual with respect to his ... conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's ... national
origin. ' 97 The E.E.O.C. Guidelines require the employer to provide an
environment free of harrassment: "The Commission has consistently
held that harrassment on the basis of national origin is a violation of
Title VII. An employer has an affirmative duty to maintain a working
environment free of harrassment on the basis of national origin. '"98
The Guidelines define national origin harrassment as follows:
Ethnic slurs, and Other verbal or physical conduct relating to
an individual's national origin constitute harrassment when this
conduct: (1) Has the purpose or effect of creating an intimi-
dating, hostile or offensive working environment; (2) has the
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's
work performance; or (3) otherwise adversely affects an indi-
vidual's employment opportunities. 99
In the work life of the Acadian laborer, ethnic harrassment by
employers and co-workers is probably the predominant form of em-
ployment discrimination experienced. The most insulting and derogatory
term levied against Acadians in the work place is the term "coonass."
This insulting word was never a proud or complimentary term affixed
to the Acadian people. Contrary to the belief of some misinformed
sources,' °° the etymology of the term is a relatively recent phenomenon.
In fact, the word was never used to describe Acadians prior to World
War II. Older Acadians will bear this out.
In World War II, when American troops were stationed in France,
it was necessary that the forces establish and maintain communication
with the Free French Forces inhabitants. Naturally, the French-speaking
Louisiana soldiers provided an invaluable resource to interpret and trans-
97. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e - 2(a)(1) (1976).
98. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.8 (1980).
99. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.8(b) (1980).
100. Unfortunately, the Honorable Edwin W. Edwards at one time proudly proclaimed
that he was a "coonass." Governor Edward's theory was that the word derived from the
name given to Andrew Jackson's volunteers when they came to New Orleans in 1815 because
they wore coonskin caps with, the tails hanging down their necks. See Edwards Under Fire
for "Coonass" Jibe, The State-Times, Oct. 24, 1972.
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mit these communications. The French soldier, possibly threatened by
his "long lost cousin," referred to the French-speaking American soldiers
as "conasse." The French noun "conasse" is defined as: "a stupid
woman or man; used specifically for a bungling prostitute (prostitute
jargon circa 1810-35); to a prostitute without a health card (1910); a
man who does stupid things (soldier jargon, 1923); in the anatomical
sense (16th Century); grossly stupid person (slang, 1718)."10, The French
word "conasse" phonetically resembles the American slur "coonass."
The non-French speaking American soldier, either out of jealousy or
invidious jest, began to harass the Louisiana soldier by calling him
"coonass" as a take off of the word "conasse" used by the French
forces. 10 2
After World War II, large numbers of non-Louisianians came to
south Louisiana for economic reasons and imported the use of the slur
in referring to the Acadian inhabitants. Unfortunately, a small contingent
of the Acadian population welcomed and promoted its use. This ignorant
acceptance was done with the unfortunate belief by some that the term
is "cute" or "humorous." Be that as it may, a majority of the Acadian
people despise the slur's use. The slur does not have a proud genesis,
nor is it indicative of a proud people. "Coonass" is in the same infamous
company as other ethnic slurs such as "Dago," "Nigger," "Kike," and
"Spick."
In 1981, by Senate Concurrent Resolution, 0 3 the Louisiana Legis-
lature condemned the use of the term "Coonass." The legislative body
traced the slur's infamous history and condemned the sale of any items
containing the word. °4
The pride and morale of all ethnic groups is seriously emasculated
when reference is made in a derogatory fashion to denote their group.
In the work place, such conduct directly contravenes the purpose of
Title VII. By imposing an affirmative duty upon the employer to main-
tain a harassment-free working environment for all national origin groups,
the statute requires the employer to become aware of national origin
harassment by both co-workers and non-employees. As one commentator
has written, "[n]o longer can an employer plead ignorance and invoke
the defense that national origin harassment between workers is merely
a personal affair."' °5 The harassment at which Title VII is directed is
101. Larousse's Dictionaire des Argots, Librairie 183 (1965) (quoted from Louisiana Con-
current Senate Resolution No. 170, Louisiana Senate Journal, 7th Reg. Session, 1981 v. 4
(July 12, 1981)).
102. See Louisiana Concurrent Senate Resolution No. 170, Louisiana Senate Journal,
7th Reg. Session, 1981 v. 4 (July 12, 1981).
103. Id.
104. Id.; see also House Concurrent Resolution No. 68, (May 21, 1974).
105. National Origin Harassment in the Workplace, 8 Empl. Rel. L.J. 282, 292 (1982).
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not confined to conduct having adverse employment consequences (e.g.,
discharge or nonpromotion), but also encompasses conduct creating "an
intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment."' 106
In its Guidelines, the E.E.O.C. has patterned its provision concerning
employer knowledge and acquiescence of, and remedies for, harassment
after its Guidelines on Sexual Harassment.l°7 The Commission has adopted
a tripartite categorization of employer liability.
As to the employer's own acts and those of its supervisors and
agents, the employer's liability is absolute:
An employer is responsible for its acts and those of its agents
and supervisory employees with respect to harassment on the
basis of national origin regardless of whether the specific acts
complained of were authorized or even forbidden by the em-
ployer and regardless of whether the employer knew or should
have known of their occurrence. The Commission will examine
the circumstances of the particular employment relationship and
the job functions performed by the individual in determining
whether an individual acts in either a supervisory or agency
capacity. 108
Hence, knowledge of the derogatory action is not necessary to impose
liability upon the employer. 1°9
With respect to conduct between fellow employees, the employer's
liability is substantially lessened:
(d) With respect to conduct between fellow employees, an em-
ployer is responsible for acts of harassment in the workplace
on the basis of national origin, where the employer, its agents
or supervisory employees knows or should have known of the
conduct, unless the employer can show that it took immediate
and appropriate corrective action." 0
The third category of employer liability refers to acts of non-em-
ployees. The Guidelines provide:
An employer may also be responsible for the acts of non-
employees with respect to harassment of employees in the work-
106. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.8 (1980).
107. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.11(a)-(g) 0980).
108. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.8(c) (1980).
109. But see Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 54 U.S.L.W. 4703 (June 19, 1986) (Female
former assistant bank manager subjected to severe sexual harassment by her male supervisor
established a violation of Title V11 by proving that discrimination based on sex had created
a hostile or abusive work environment regardless of any "economic" or "tangible" dis-
crimination. However, employers are not always absolutely liable for sexual harassment by
their supervisors.).
110. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.8(d) (1980).
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place on the basis of national origin, where the employer, its
agents or supervisory employees, knows or should have known
of the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate
corrective action. In reviewing these cases, the Commission will
consider the extent of the employer's control and any other legal
responsibility which the employer may have with respect to the
conduct of such non-employees."'
The E.E.O.C. purposely intended to impose a high duty upon the
employer for national origin harassment in the workplace."1 2 Many de-
cisions prior to the promulgation of the Guidelines" 3 had mandated that
comments aimed at a person's ethnic origin be "excessive and opprob-
rious" or that the employer have knowledge of such disparate harass
ment, for the employer to be held liable." 14 In particular, one court
noted:
[Ilt is my belief that employees' psychological as well as economic
fringes are statutorily entitled to protection from employer abuse,
and that the phrase, "terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment" in Section 703 is an expansive concept which sweeps
within its protective ambit the practice of creating a working
environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimina-
tion.' 5
II. THE ALLEGORICAL INTERPRETATION OF "RACE"
AND THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 1981 TO "WHITE"
NATIONAL ORIGIN GROUPS SUCH As NATIVE-BORN AcADI ' S
For an aggrieved laborer victimized by an unlawful employment
practice to succeed under a Title VII claim, the petitioner must first
I1. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.8(e) (1980).
112. See 45 Fed. Reg. 85635 (1980).
113. The Guidelines were promulgated in 1980.
114. See Carriddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1977)
(Supervisor's derogatory ethnic comments about plaintiff's ancestry were not unlawful be-
cause the remarks were part of "casual conversations" and not "excessive and opprob-
rious."); cf. Morales v. Dain, Kalman and Quail, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 1031 (E.D. Minn.
1979); Kidd v. American Air Filter Co., 23 F.E.P. 381 (W.D. Ky. 1980); Fekete v. United
States Steel Corp., 353 F. Supp. 1177 (W.D. Pa. 1973); Enriquez v. Transit Mixed Concrete
Co., 492 F. Supp. 390 (C.D. Cal. 1980); accord 8 Empl. Rel. L. J. 287-292 (1982). See
contra, 2 F.E.P. 295 (1969) (Plaintiff, who was butt of Polish jokes by co-employees and
was physically harassed, was entitled to judgment against employees who permitted the rid-
icule.). See also, Brown v. Parker Hannifan Corp., 36 F.E.P. 127 (10th Cir. 1984) (evidence
adduced by plaintiff, a German-American who was allegedly discharged for insubordination,
that the employer tolerated other employees' slurs directed at plaintiff because of her German
ancestry was sufficient to defeat employer's Motion for Summary Judgment).
115. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
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satisfy some rather rigid procedural prerequisites." 6 For instance, under
Title VII, a petitioner must first exhaust his remedies with the E.E.O.C.
as well as satisfy strict time limitation requirements." 7 Secondly, peti-
tioner must file a complaint in federal district court within ninety days
of receipt of a statutory notice of "right to sue" letter from the
E.E.O.C."8 Furthermore, under Title VII, employers with less than
fifteen employees are exempted from the coverage of the Act," 9 and
the Act does not provide for punitive damages and backpay for more
than two years. 20 Finally, the overwhelming weight of authority is that
there is no right to a jury trial under Title VII.'
Many plaintiff attorneys in employment discrimination actions, either
out of necessity or out of preference, attempt to procure relief for their
clients under alternative statutory authorities such as Section 1981.122
Section 1981 makes available an independent remedy for employment
discrimination, thus providing an alternative to the procedural prereq-
uisites of Title VII. Section 1981 does not require that a complaint be
filed with the E.E.O.C., 23 and the controlling statute of limitations is
the most appropriate one provided by state law. 24 Furthermore, an
individual is entitled to both compensatory and punitive damages, and
a backpay award is not limited by the two-year time period of Title
VII.' 21 In addition jury trials are available under this section, 2 6 which
also expands the protections beyond the immunities listed under Title
VII.
116. For a comprehensive account of the exhaustive prerequisites to a timely E.E.O.C.
charge, see Schlei & Grossman, supra note 32, at 1058-92.
117. See Title VII § 706.
118. See Title VII § 706(7)(1). A "Right to Sue" letter is generally perceived as an au-
thorization for the aggrieved person to bring a civil action after the E.E.O.C. has reviewed
the circumstances of the charge. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(e)(l). See also Anooya v. Hilton
Hotels Corp., 733 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1984).
119. As are private clubs and religious institutions. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e - 1
(1976).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e - 5(g) (1976). See also Comment, Developments in the Law -
Sections 1981, 15 Harv. C.R. - C.L.L. Rev. 29, 104-05 (1980) [hereinafter cited as De-
velopments in the Law].
121. See, e.g., Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1975). But see Curtis v. Loether,
415 U.S. 189, 94 S. Ct. 1005 (1974) (jury trial under Title VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights
Act required because of the right to monetary relief).
122. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
123. Caldwell v. National Brewery Co., 443 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1971); see Developments
in the Law, supra note 120. at 105.
124. Burnette v. Grattan, 104 S. Ct. 2924 (1984); cf. Richardson v. Delta Drayage Co.,
433 F. Supp. 50 (E.D. La. 1977).
125. See, e.g., Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460, 95 S. Ct.
1716, 1720 (1975).
126. Setser v. Novack Inc., 638 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1981); Johnson v. Sea Drilling Corp.,
486 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. La, 1980).
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This part will explore the dilemma of a native-born Acadian laborer
who attempts to proceed under Section 1981 and who is confronted
with jurisprudence which does not allow a "white" ethnic to recover
for national origin discrimination under that section.
A. Guarantees of Section 1981
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right ... to make and enforce contracts, to sue,
be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of
all laws ... as is enjoyed by white citizens .... "I
The chief rationale for the enactment of this legislation in 1866 was
to eradicate the devastating effects of the "Black Codes" of the southern
states which had seriously emasculated the recently freed slaves. 2 Never-
theless, the enfranchisement and protection of blacks was not the exclusive
reason for the enactment of the legislation. The bill was introduced to
protect the civil rights of all persons in the United States. 129 As the Supreme
Court said in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transporation Co., 30 holding
that Section 1981 also protects whites from racial discrimination: "First,
we cannot accept the view that the terms of [Section] 1981 exclude its
application to racial discrimination against white persons. On the contrary,
the statute explicitly applies to 'all persons,' including white persons."' 3 '
Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument that the phrase, "as
is enjoyed by white citizens," was meant to limit the class of Section
1981 to non-whites. 32 The Court emphasized that Congress inserted the
127. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976). Section 1981 was originally enacted as § I of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, Ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, pursuant to the enabling clause of the Thirteenth
Amendment. After ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, the statute was reen-
acted as part of the Enforcement Act of 1870, Ch. 114 §§ 16, 18, 16 Stat. 144. See Schlei
& Grossman, supra note 32, at 668.
128. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 427-29, 88 S. Ct. 2186, 2197-
98 (1968); see also Note, National Origin Discrimination under Section 1981, 51 Fordham
L. Rev. 919-20 (1983).
129. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 96 S. Ct. 2574 (1976); see
Ortiz v. Bank of America, 547 F. Supp. 550, 554 (E.D. Cal. 1982) ("[Tjhe bill was introduced
... as a 'bill ... to protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights'; "[Tlhe
purpose of the bill was to secure the equality of citizens ... in the enjoyment of 'civil rights
and immunities."'); Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 211, 1117 (1866); cf. In re Parrott,
I F. 481, 508-09 (C.C.D. Cal. 1880) (construing the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to
every person whether "Christian or heathen, civilized or barbarous, Caucasian or Mon-
golian" in light of § 1981, which was enacted "in consonance" with the amendment).
130. 427 U.S. 273, 96 S. Ct. 2574 (1976).
131. Id. at 287, 96 S. Ct. at 2582; see also, United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S.
649, 675-76, 18 S. Ct. 456, 467 (1898).
132. 427 U.S. at 289, 96 S. Ct. at 2583 (quoting Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 791,
86 S. Ct. 1783, 1789 (1966). See Note, supra note 128, at 922; see Developments in the Law,
supra note 120, at 74.
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phrase to stress the statute's "racial character," and to indicate that,
for purposes of the Act, women or minors were not to be included
among "all persons.'"
Section 1981 prohibits discrimination both by private parties,3 4 and
by state actors.' The Supreme Court has interpreted Section 1981 to
apply to aliens 3 6 despite the "racial emphasis" of the statute,'3 The
issue of the justiciability of claims based on national origin discrimination
has remained unanswered by the Supreme Court. In Delaware State
College v. Ricks,131 through a footnote, 39 the Court explicitly left the
question unanswered.
Section 1981 was re-enacted in 1870 pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment.14' The equal protection clause of that amendment subjects
arbitrary state classification based on race and national origin to the
highest degree of judicial scrutiny 4' because these classifications are
considered "suspect." 42 Therefore, considering the statutory purpose of
133. 427 U.S. at 295, 96 S. Ct. at 2585; see also Ortiz, 547 F. Supp. at 555; Cong.
Globe, 39th Cong., 1st. Sess. 1115, 157 App. (1866).
134. Runyon v. McCrary,,427 U.S. 160, 168, 96 S. Ct. 2586, 2593 (1976); cf. Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437, 88 S. Ct. 2186, 2202 (1968) (companion statute
to § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976) also prohibits acts of discrimination by private parties);
see Note, supra note 128, at 919.
135. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 16, 3 S. Ct. 18, 25 (1883); see Note, supra
note 128, at 919.
136. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 377, 91 S. Ct. 1848, 1854 (1971); Takahashi
v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419-20, 68 S. Ct. 1138, 1142-42 (1948). See Note,
supra note 128, at 922 n.27; see also Baier, Foreword: Of Alienage, Judicial Heroes, and
Equal Protection, 30 Loyola L. Rev. 619 (1984). But see Ben Yakir v. Gaylinn Assoc., Inc.,
535 F. Supp. 543 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (§ 1981 does not protect aliens from private dis-
crimination on the basis of alienage); cf. Espinoza, 414 U.S. 86, 94 S. Ct. 334 (1973) (aliens
not covered under Title VII).
137. Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1536 (1870); see Guerra v. Manchester Terminal
Corp., 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974); cf. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 86
S. Ct. 2186 (1968); Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 419-20, 68 S. Ct. at 1142-43.
138. 449 U.S. 250, 101 S. Ct. 498 (1980).
139. Id. at 256 n.6, 101 S. Ct. at 503 n.6.
140. Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 419-20, 68 S. Ct. at 1142-43; Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24,
32, 68 S. Ct. 847, 851 (1948); see Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369, 6 S. Ct. 1064,
1070 (1886) (The Fourteenth Amendment applies universally, without regard to race, color,
or nationality and § 1981 was enacted therewith); Note, supra note 128, at 940-41.
141. Only a "compelling state interest" will overcome such classifications. See, e.g.,
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 65 S. Ct. 193 (1944) (The forced imprisonment
during World War 11 of people of Japanese ancestry was upheld because of a compelling
need to prevent espionage and sabotage in the U.S.).
142. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 480, 74 S. Ct. 667, 671 (1954) (Dis-
crimination against Mexican-Americans with regard to jury service was treated in the same
way that discrimination against blacks would have been. The test was whether the group
suffered from "community prejudices."); cf. University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978) (Official discrimination against any ethnic or racial group
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Section 1981, it is highly incongruous to proscribe national origin dis-
crimination in all but compelling circumstances under the Fourteenth
Amendment and not recognize similar protections Under the Act. Fur-
thermore, since aliens are afforded protection under Section 1981 because
it was enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, a serious anomaly
results when an alien who is a victim of employment discrimination
based On his ethnic ancestry is successful under Section 1981, while an
American citizen of the very same ancestry is denied protection under
the same act. 43
B. Application of Section 1981 to National Origin Discrimination
Claims as Interpreted by the Lower Federal Courts
The lower federal courts are in dispute as to the correct application
of Section 1981 to claims based on national origin discrimination. Four
different approaches may be identified. Some courts have resolved the
issue by stating that the section does not provide a cause of action for
national origin discrimination under any circumstances.'" Other courts
afford Section 1981 protection to Hispanic plaintiffs and other perceived
"non-white" groups if the plaintiffs can show that the alleged discrim-
ination was of a "racial" as opposed to a "national origin" character.
145
A third line of cases, which employs what has been labeled the "prag-
matic" approach,' 46 recognizes the impossibility of distinguishing "race"
merits "strict scrutiny," even if that group had never been an especially discrete and insular
minority.).
143. See generally Note, supra note 128, at 938-39.
144. See Vera v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 448 F. Supp. 610, 613 (M.D. Pa. 1978) (Puerto
Rican plaintiffs may not state a cause of action under § 1981 although the discrim-
ination they experience is similar to racial discrimination.); Hiduchenko v. Minneapolis Med-
ical & Diagnostic Center Ltd., 467 F. Supp. 103, 106 (D. Minn. 1979) (Plaintiff of Ukranian
descent was not of a race other than Caucasian and could not state a claim for racial dis-
crimination under § 1981.); see also Thomas v. Rohner-Gehrig & Co., 582 F. Supp. 669
(N.D. Ill. 1984) (White American failed to state a claim under § 1981 for national origin
or racial discrimination against foreign corporation operating in the United States.). See
generally Note, supra note 128, at 920; Ortiz, 547 F. Supp. at 559-565 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
145. Bullard v. OMI Georgia, Inc., 640 F.2d 632, 634 (5th Cir. 1981) (recognizing that
the distinction between national origin and racial discrimination is extremely difficult to
trace); Apocada v. General Elec. Co., 445 F. Supp. 821, 823-24 (D.N.M. 1978) (Spanish
surnamed plaintiff granted leave to amend complaint raised pursuant to § 1981 so that he
could allege discrimination on the basis of race); Madrigal v. Certainteed Corp., 508 F. Supp.
310 (W.D. Mo. 1981) (§ 1981 applies to Hispanics only to the extent that discrimination
stems from motives indistinguishable from racial discrimination); cf. Budinsky, 425 F. Supp.
786 (persons of Slavic, Italian or Jewish origin do not fall within coverage of § 1981).
146. See, e.g., Budinsky, 425 F. Supp. 786 (plaintiff of Slavic ancestry not within a
covered group under § 1981); Manzanares, 593 F.2d 968 (plaintiff of Mexican descent who
was discriminated against on this basis stated a valid cause of action under § 1981). See
generally Larson, supra note 33, § 94:30 at 20-17.
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from "national origin," and extends 1981 coverage only to those national
origin groups that are commonly perceived as "non-white" and that
have traditionally been the victims of class discrimination. 47 Finally, a
fourth category totally rejects using the ambiguous notion of "race"
and holds that, to be' protected under Section 1981, a plaintiff must
belong to a distinctive group that has been treated differently than the
groups enjoying the broadest civil rights. 41
This last approach employs what may be characterized as an "iden-
tifiable national orgin" analysis. Both the "pragmatic" approach and
the "identifiable national origin" analysis reject the distinctions between
race and national origin and have established a novel solution to dis-
criminatory employment practices directed against various ancestry groups.
The following subparts, will review these two approaches.
1. The "Pragmatic" Approach
The "pragmatic" approach to Section 1981 was first enunciated by
a federal court in Budinsky v. Corning Glass Works.'49 In Budinsky,
the plaintiff raised both Title VII and Section 1981 claims in an em-
ployment discrimination action against his former employer. He alleged
that he was disparately treated by his employer solely because of his
Slavic origin. The defendant moved to dismiss on the basis that, inter
alia, allegations of discrimination based on national origin are not cog-
nizable under Section 198 1.
The thrust of the plaintiff's argument was that, given the dubious
utility of the traditional definition of race and the sociological and
scientific rejection of that definition, Section 1981 should not be limited
to racial classifications. As an alternative, plaintiff submitted:
[Section] 1981 should not stand alone among the post-war Civil
Rights Acts as frozen by a wording and legislative history written
before the great influx of white European immigrants in this
country, but should be expanded to protect all groups of po-
tential discriminatees who are identifiable as a "race" or "na-
tionality," or by "'national origin."'-10
In announcing the new "pragmatic" approach, Judge Teitelbaum
said:
The terms "race" and "racial discrimination" may be of such
doubtful sociological validity as to be scientifically meaningless,
147. E.g., Ridgeway v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local No. 134, 466 F. Supp.
595, 597 (N.D. III. 1979); see generally Note, supra note 128, at 921.
148. Ortiz, 547 F. Supp. 550, 567; AI-Khazraji v. Saint Francis College, 523 F. Supp.
386, 391-92 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
149. 425 F. Supp. 786.
150. Id. at 788.
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but these terms nonetheless are subject to a commonly-accepted,
albeit sometimes vague, understanding. Those courts which have
extended the coverage of § 1981 have done so on a realistic
basis, within the framework of this common meaning and un-
derstanding. On this admittedly unscientific basis, whites are
plainly a "race" susceptible to "racial discrimination;" Hispanic
persons and Indians, like blacks, have been traditional victims
of group discrimination, and however inaccurately or stupidly,
are frequently and even commonly subject to a "racial" iden-
tification as "non-whites." There is accordingly both a practical
need and a logical reason to extend § 1981's proscription against
exclusively "racial" employment discrimination to these groups
of potential discriminatees. 5'
Nevertheless, the court denied this protection to "European ethnic
groups," stating:
The same cannot be said with regard to persons of Slavic or
Italian or Jewish origin. These groups are not so commonly
identified as "races" nor so frequently subject to that "racial"
discrimination which is the specific and exclusive target of §
1981. Members of these groups, like plaintiff Budinsky, do not
properly fall within the coverage of the statute.'
In the next paragraph of the opinion, the court presented what is
arguably an unworkable application of Section 1981:
We wish to re-emphasize our starting point: The above result
might be entirely different were it not for the brief but robust
existence of Title VII. That legislation provides a thorough rem-
edy for victims of employment discrimination based on, inter
alia, national origin. If, as alleged, plaintiff is in fact such a
discriminatee, Congress has provided him and others like him
with a comprehensive means of redress. For this reason, there
is neither need nor justification for judicially legislating § 1981
beyond the specific, prevalent and arguably more difficult mode
of employment discrimination to which it is directed.'53
The judge based his reasoning on the availability, in many cases,
of an alternative remedy-Title VII. Nevertheless, merely because a Slavic
or Acadian-American has a remedy under Title VII for illegal employ-
ment practices does not justify limiting Section 1981 protection. Each
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 788-89; see also Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., 473 F. Supp. 506, 514
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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legislative pronouncement must stand on its own merits and be judged
on its own terms and inclusiveness.
Judge Teitelbaum's recognition of the untenability of "racial"
distinctions 5 4 should be applauded, but a more equitable approach would
be to apply the true intent of Congress when it enacted Section 1981-
i.e., to guarantee the same civil rights to all persons, and prohibit illegal
discrimination against all groups. Certainly, invidious class discrimination
levied against Acadians is as egregious as the same treatment directed
against Hispanics or Arab-Americans."'
2. The "Identifiable National Origin " Approach
In Ortiz v. Bank of America,"56 a federal district court completely
rejected the exclusivity of the racial standard of Section 1981 and held
that a plaintiff may state a valid claim under that section based on
either national origin or race."" Under the Ortiz standard, a plaintiff
who alleges national origin discrimination must show that he is a member
of a group composed of both sexes, which is not fixed exclusively by
age or religious faith, and which is of a character that is or may be
perceived as distinct when measured against the groups which enjoy the
broadest rights."'
The court rejected the racial classification as exclusive under Section
1981 because it found racial tests to be ambiguous and impractical. The
court stated:
Today much of modern science's thoughts about the meaning
of race, to the degree the term is accepted as meaningful at all,
are tied to geographic distribution and culture, i.e. the two
common components of nationality concepts. Thus, Molnar,
after listing several attempts at definitions of race by biologists
or anthropologists, observes "The definitions above, though they
appear quite diverse, have in common certain factors that they
emphasize. The first is an assumption about the role of geo-
graphic distribution in race formation. Primarily, the divisions
are based on the sharing of a common territory or point in
space. . . ." And as Montagu has written 'Race,' it should
always be remembered is a human grouping which is culturally
154. See, e.g., Banker v. Time Chem., Inc., 579 F. Supp. 1183 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (protection
offered by § 1981 extended to Americans of East Indian ancestry).
155. In AI-Khazraji, 523 F. Supp. 386 (W.D. Pa. 1981), the court held that a college
professor who was denied tenure because he was an Arabian born in Iraq could serve as
a basis for a valid claim under section 1981.
156. 547 F. Supp. 550.
157. Id. at 568.
158. Id.
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defined in a given society." . . . Thus to the degree that science
aids at all in resolution of the legal problem tendered, it appears
fair to say that no meaningful distinction can be drawn between
"race" and "national origin.'' 1 9
The court went further than the so-called "practical" approach when
it added: "It might be argued, however, that even if there is no scientific
content to the notion of race - a common meaning exists - and it
should be employed. On examination, however, no single meaning suf-
ficient to resolve the issue exists. ' ' 60
The court illustrated how impractical reliance on "race" is as a
prerequisite to a Section 1981 cause of action when it said:
Without doubt blacks have been the subject of the most per-
sistent racism in this country. Nonetheless, "racial" justification
for discrimination against almost every immigrant (and native)
group has plagued this country's intellectual history. Both the
German and the Irish immigrants (whose descendants are now
generally viewed as "native stock") were believed by many Amer-
icans to be "racially" inferior . . . , as were of course the
Chinese and American Indians .... The history of "racial
prejudice" against Jews throughout Europe and in this country
appears to be so well known as almost not to require docu-
mentation .... Indeed the racist quality of thinking in this
country is so persistent that it was even used to explain why
Northern whites defeated Southern whites in the American Civil
War. The idea of race as an element of the history of ideas in
this country has frequently been no more than a vehicle of
racism, i.e., a presumed inherited defect in those who are not
of the racist's kind, however, he defines his kind.' 6 '
The breadth of Section 1981 should not be limited exclusively to
the social conditions existing at the time of its original enactment in
1866. Situations have changed drastically since then and a broader
attitude against discrimination has emerged. 62 The concept of discrim-
ination is neither stationary nor confined to a limited number of groups.
As Holmes declared in Towne v. Eisner:63 "A word is not a crystal,
159. Id. at 566 (quoting A. Montagu, Man's Most Dangerous Myth, 30 Passem. (1964)
and S. Molner, Races, Types & Ethnic Groups, 12-14 (1975)); see generally Note, supra note
128, at 929.
160. 547 F. Supp. at 566.
161. Id. at 567 (citations omitted); see also People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399, 404-05 (1854);
cf. Note, supra note 128, at 932.
162. See, e.g., Brest, Forward: In Defense of the Anti-discrimination Principle, 90 Harv.
L. Rev. 1 (1976).
163. 245 U.S. 418, 38 S. Ct. 158 (1918).
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transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may
vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and
the time in which it is used."'6 Furthermore, the inclusion of whites
and aliens within the scope of Section 1981 should lend credence to the
position that victims of national origin discrimination should be similarly
protected, regardless of their standing to proceed under Title VII.
C. Native-Born Acadians Under Section 1981
Contrary to an obviously erroneous "dictionary" definition of Ca-
juns,16 5 Acadians asserting Section 1981 protection will probably be treated
like Americans of southern and eastern European ancestry. These groups
are commonly known as the "white" or "caucasian" ethnic groups.'6
If the Supreme Court adopts the "identifiable national origin" ap-
proach in handling Section 1981 claims, the three-prong test as set forth
in Ortiz6 7 for determining whether a plaintiff has stated a valid claim
under Section 1981 based on national origin discrimination, as applied
to a native-born Acadian, reveals the following:
1. Native-born Acadians are comprised of both men and women;
2. The boundaries of the group are not fixed by age or ex-
clusively by religious faith;
3. Native-born Acadians are or may be perceived as distinct
when measured against their Anglo-Saxon neighbors who enjoy
the broadest rights.
Obviously, Acadians satisfy the first two prongs of the analysis; a
more serious challenge, however, may be levied against an Acadian
attempting to meet the third prong of the test. A defendant in a Section
1981 claim brought by a native-born Acadian might submit that Acadians
164. Id. at 425, 38 S. Ct. at 159.
165. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 313 (1976) defines "Cajuns" as: "One
of a people of mixed white, Indian, and Negro ancestry in southwest Alabama and adjoining
sections of Mississippi." A reader should immediately question this account on the basis
of the reference to the geographical location as being in parts of Mississippi and Alabama.
Also, Acadians have never credibly been defined as being of mixed "racial" bloods. The
Acadian's "racial" genesis derives from French stock.
166. See Hiduchenko, 467 F. Supp. 103, 106; Thomas, 582 F. Supp. 669 (complaint
alleging that individuals of the "American race" were discharged by individuals of the "Swiss-
German race" did not state claim for relief under § 1981 although plaintiffs were given
opportunity to amend their complaint on the basis of "reverse alienage discrimination").
167. First, plaintiff must allege discrimination on the basis of membership in a group
composed of both men and women; second, the boundaries of the group must not be ex-
clusively fixed by age or religious faith; and finally, the group must be of a character that
is or may be perceived as being distinct when measured against the group which enjoys the
broader rights.
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have been substantially integrated into the Anglo-American culture, have
achieved remarkable economic strides, and are actively represented in
the political process. Hence, the Acadians could not be considered a
"discrete and insular minority"' 61 in need of special legislative protection.
An Acadian plaintiff can counter these averments by submitting that
the Anglo-conformist and melting pot theories are themselves inherently
discriminatory, since they presume assimilation into a majority culture
which, inferentially, places a badge of inferiority on the Acadian cul-
ture.169 Furthermore, political representation and economic stability are
not satisfactory guidelines for the degree of discrimination which a group
must tolerate. As Justice Powell said in University of California Regents
v. Bakke170 in rejecting the argument that, since white males are not a
"discrete and insular minority" who require extraordinary protection
from the majoritarian political process, the court should not apply "strict
scrutiny" to the special admissions program at issue: "[Tlhis rationale
has never been invoked in our decisions as a prerequisite to subjecting
racial or ethnic distinctions to strict scrutiny. Nor has this Court held
that discreteness and insularity constitute necessary preconditions to a
holding that a particular classification is invidious.' ' 7 1
The native-born Acadian is not attempting to invoke unwarranted
protections when he elects to proceed under Section 1981. He is only
attempting to invoke the protection he justly deserves, as is borne out
by the historical and equitable protections provided by the Act.
III. THE RIGHTS OF NATIVE-BORN AcAitAs
UNDER THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
As was indicated in Part II of this article, it is not a foregone
conclusion that native-born Acadians should be granted protection under
Section 1981, considering the lower federal courts' insistence on limiting
the Act's coverage to claims based on racially motivated discrimination.
Furthermore, Title VII does not provide a remedy for all employees
subjected to illegal employment practices in the workplace. As was
discussed, Title VII does not apply to employers who employ less than
fifteen employees, nor is it applicable to private clubs or religious
168. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4, 58 S. Ct. 778,
783 n.4 (1938) (prejudice against "discrete and insular" minorities may be a special condition
which tends to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon
to protect minorities.).
169. See Munafo, National Origin Discrimination Against Americans of Southern and
Eastern European Ancestry: A Review of the Legal History and Judicial Interpretations,
25 Cath. Law. 50, 72 (1979).
170. 438 U.S. 265, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978).
171. Id. at 290, 98 S. Ct. at 2748.
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institutions."' Likewise, the corresponding Louisiana fair employment
statute17 exempts from the definition of covered employers those with
fewer than fifteen employees. Also, it is possible that Acadian discri-
minatees will not meet some of the stern procedural prerequisites of
Title VII, and consequently, may be left without a statutory remedy.
The purpose of this part is to examine the feasibility of a native-
born Acadian prevailing in a class-based claim under the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 74 in light of the plaintiff's burden
of proving the requisite "state action' ' 7 and that the disparate treatment
spawned from a purposefully discriminatory intent. 176
A. "Suspect" Classifications Based on National Origin and the
Native-Born A cadian
Whenever a state or local government 77 or agency thereof inten-
tionally discriminates against a class of people based on race 78 or national
origin, 79 and, under certain circumstances, alienage, 80 the courts should
172. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, 2000e-I (1976).
173. La. R.S. 23:1006 (1985).
174. U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part:
"No state shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
175. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 3 S. Ct. 18 (1883) (State action is the focus
of the Fourteenth Amendment; "[i]ndividual invasion of individual rights" is not prohibited
thereby. Id. at 11, 3 S. Ct. at 21.). But see Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S.
715, 81 S. Ct. 856 (1961) (If the conduct of the government is sufficiently involved in the
private person's conduct or encourages that conduct or benefits therefrom, then the private
person's acts will be deemed state action.).
176. State or other governmental conduct must have a racially or ethnically discriminatory
purpose to render it unconstitutional. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S. Ct.
2040 (1976); contra Griggs, 401 U.S. 424, 91 S. Ct. 849 (1971).
177. The Fourteenth Amendment applies to any state, including all subdivisions or local
governments within a state. The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment imposes a similar
equal protection mandate upon the federal government. See Nowak, Rotunda, and Young,
Constitutional Law 536 (2d ed. 1983).
178. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I, I1, 87 S. Ct. 1817, 1823 (1967) (state
law prohibiting interracial marriages violative of equal protection although applicable to both
whites and blacks alike, because it had for its purpose an invidious intent-to "preserve
racial integrity").
179. See, e.g., Hernandez, 347 U.S. 475, 74 S. Ct. 667 (discrimination against Mexican-
Americans in reference to jury service treated in same way that discrimination against blacks
would have been).
180. See, e.g., Graham, 403 U.S. 365, 91 S. Ct. 1848 (classifications based on alienage in-
herently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny). Contra Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S.
291, 98 S. Ct. 1067 (1978) ("It would be inappropriate . . . to require every statutory ex-
clusion of aliens to clear the high hurdle of 'strict scrutiny,' because to do so would 'obliterate
all the distinctions between citizens and aliens, and thus, depreciate the value of citizenship."'
Id. at 294, 98 S. Ct. at 1070, quoting Nyquist v. Mauclst 432 U.S. 1, 97 S. Ct. 2120 (1977)).
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subject the government classification to "strict scrutiny."'' This is so
because the governmental classifications are deemed to be "suspect,' '8 2
and should be struck down as violative of equal protection if it is shown
that the purpose for the invidious classification was to discriminate
against a protected group. The same principle applies even if it is shown
that the governmental classification, though racially or ethnically neutral
on its face, is administered in a discriminatory fashion," 3 or if it can
definitively be inferred that the governmental scheme was to discriminate
intentionally. 184
In Hernandez v. Texas, 85 the petitioner, an American of Mexican
ancestry, was convicted and sentenced for a murder. The petitioner
alleged that since persons of Mexican descent were systematically ex-
cluded from service on the various juries, he was deprived of equal
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Supreme Court found for the petitioner, holding that the systematic
exclusion of eligible Mexican-Americans from jury service violated the
equal protection clause. In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Warren,
the Court said: "The exclusion of otherwise eligible persons from jury
service solely because of their ancestry or national origin is discrimination
prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment."'18 6
The Court reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment is not limited
solely to a two-class, "white" and "black," racial classification, but is
concerned more generally with invidious class prejudice. The Court said:
Throughout our history differences in race and color have
defined easily identifiable groups which have at times required
the aid of the courts in securing equal treatment under the laws.
But community prejudices are not static, and from time to time
other differences from the community norm may define other
groups which need the same protection. Whether such a group
exists within a community is a question of fact. When the
existence of a distinct class is demonstrated, and it is further
181. The highest level of judicial review imposed upon a governmental classification. To
survive "strict scrutiny," the classification must be necessary to promote a compelling state
interest. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216, 65 S. Ct. at 194.
182. Classifications by the government which treat differently a group which has his-
torically been victimized by discriminatory acts. See, e.g., Korematsu, 323 U.S. 215, 65 S.
Ct. 193.
183. E.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S. Ct. 1064 (1886) (ordinance, although
neutral on its face, unenforceable when its application would oppress members of the Chinese
race).
184. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 102 S. Ct. 3272 (1982) (at-large electoral system
of county government maintained for invidious purpose of diluting voting strength of black
population created an inference of intentional discrimination).
185. 347 U.S. 475, 74 S. Ct. 667.
186. Id. at 479, 74 S. Ct. at 671.
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shown that the laws, as written or as applied, single out that
class for different treatment not based on some reasonable clas-
sification, the guarantees of the Constitution have been violated.
The Fourteenth Amendment is not directed solely against dis-
crimination due to a "two-class theory"-that is, based upon
differences between "white" and Negro.,"1
The Court adopted a flexible "community prejudices" test which ap-
parently varies from community to community. This test would appear
to provide protection for any ethnic group that can demonstrate a real
existence of animus directed against the group on a regional basis.
In Hernandez, it was shown that in the county where the petitioner
was tried, Mexicans were looked upon as a separate class by the "whites"
and were subjected to downgrading class prejudice. Mexican children
were forced to attend separate schools from the white children, and
some business establishments would not serve Mexicans. At the court-
house square there existed separate toilet facilities for whites and Mex-
icans. 1 s The above factors were significant in helping petitioner show
the discriminatory atmosphere in the community.
It is highly unlikely that, until relatively recently, Acadians were
subjected to such blatant class prejudice as was the case in Jackson
County, Texas toward Mexicans. Nevertheless, Acadians have been ex-
posed to a more subtle or latent form of class discrimination which, in
many instances, continues to the present date. It must be remembered
that Acadians have migrated to regions outside of Louisiana where the
Anglo-Americanized way of life predominates and where they are still
looked upon as "bas clas." For example, a substantial community of
Acadians resides in east Texas in cities such as Port Arthur and Orange.
It is extremely common to hear Acadians from these areas pronounce
their Acadian surnames in a way which is more phonetically pleasing
to their Anglo neighbors.8 9
In 1880, in dictum, the Supreme Court adopted a premise which
may have far reaching effects in bolstering the position that invidious
class prejudices directed against Acadians and other "white" ethnic
groups should be subjected to strict scrutiny. In Strauder v. West Vir-
ginia,190 the petitioner, a black, was convicted of murder by a jury from
which blacks had been barred pursuant to a state law which allowed
187. Id. at 478, 74 S. Ct. at 670.
188. Id. at 479, 74 S. Ct. at 671.
189. E.g., the Acadian surname "Trahan" is often pronounced "TRAHAN" when in
fact the French pronunciation would be "TRAHAN."
190. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
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only white males to serve as jurors. 9' . In holding that the statute dis-
criminated against blacks as a class on its face, and therefore violated
the equal protection clause, the Court stated: "Nor if a law should be
passed excluding all naturalized Celtic Irishmen, would there be any
doubt of its inconsistency with the spirit of the [Fourteenth]
[A]mendment."'19 2 Although this language is pure dicta, it demonstrates
that, even in the early years of equal protection, the Supreme Court
was willing to subject any officially sanctioned class prejudice to a high
form of judicial scrutiny.
The modem Supreme Court has substantially widened the protection
afforded to ethnic groups. In University of California Regents v. Bakke,193
Justice Powell, who announced the opinion of the Court, attacked the
notion of a "two-class theory" in analyzing suspect classifications and
opted to hold any ethnic or racial classification to strict scrutiny. The
opinion stated:
During the dormancy of the Equal Protection Clause, the United
States had become a Nation of minorities. Each had to struggle-
and to some extent struggles still-to overcome the prejudices
not of a monolithic majority, but of a "majority" composed
of various minority groups of whom it was said-perhaps un-
fairly in many cases-that a shared characteristic was a will-
ingness to disadvantage other groups. As the Nation filled with
the stock of many lands, the reach of the Clause was gradually
extended to all ethnic groups seeking protection from official
discrimination. 194
The Justice added: "Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are
inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial exami-
nation." '9
As the Supreme Court said in Hirabayshi v. United States, 196 "Dis-
tinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their
very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon
the doctrine of equality.""' Certainly, in the name of freedom and
justice, this same principle applies to the Acadian people wherever they
decide to make their home.
191. The statute provided: "All white male persons who are twenty-one years of age
and who are citizens of this State shall be liable to serve as jurors." See id. at 305.
192. Id. at 308.
193. 438 U.S. 265, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978).
194. Id. at 292, 98 S. Ct. at 2749; see also Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 36 S. Ct. 7
(1915) (regarding Austrian resident aliens).
195. 438 U.S. at 291, 98 S. Ct. at 2748.
196. 320 U.S. 81, 63 S. Ct. 1375 (1943).
197. Id. at 100, 63 S. Ct. at 1385.
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B. Constitutional Prerequisites to a Claim Under
the Fourteenth Amendment
1. The "State Action" requirement- The private actor
as a "pseudo state creature"
The Fourteenth Amendment does not reach purely private discrim-
inatory conduct. As the Supreme Court stated in Shelley v. Kraemer, 98
"[The Fourteenth Amendment] erects no shield against merely private
conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.""' The commands of the
equal protection clause apply only to prejudicial misconduct instituted
by the state or by private individuals or entities where it can be said
that the conduct is "fairly attributable to the state. ' '200 This subsection
will explore the possibilities of holding a private actor responsible under
the equal protection clause for intentionally invoked disparate treatment
directed against Acadians as a class, especially in situations where the
discriminator would be free from suit. 20'
The Supreme Court has indicated that there is no "bright line" test
to determine whether particular discriminatory conduct is "private" or
amounts to "state action." In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Author-
ity,202 the Court indicated that whether "state action" exists in a par-
ticular situation can be determined "[oinly by sifting facts and weighing
circumstances." 20 3 The crucial factor is the interplay of the governmental
and private action.2' 4
In short, if it can be shown that the private discriminator was
operating in a function which has traditionally been the exclusive domain
of the state, 205 or that the governing body has sufficiently involved itself
198. 334 U.S. 1, 66 S. Ct. 836 (1948).
199. Id. at 13, 66 S. Ct. at 842.
200. See, e.g., Frazier v. Board of Trustees, 777 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1985).
201. The proper action to bring under these circumstances is for a "deprivation under
'color of law."' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1985). Section 1983 allows a private suit for damages
caused as a result of one who "under color of any [state] statute" or "other laws" deprives
another of "any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and the laws."
"State action," while necessary to establish the deprivation of any constitutional rights, when
present, is also sufficient to meet the under color of law element of § 1983 itself. Lugar
v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 2744 (1982).
202. 365 U.S. 715, 81 S. Ct. 856 (1961).
203. Id. at 722, 81 S. Ct. at 860.
204. See 16A Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 743 (1979).
205. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 73 S. Ct. 809 (1953) (the holding of pri-
maries); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 S. Ct. 270 (1946) (privately owned company
town); Robinson v. Price, 553 F.2d 918 (5th Cir. 1977) (private non-profit corporation ful-
filled a welfare function by expending funds granted to it by the city); Smith v. Y.M.C.A.
of Montgomery, Inc., 462 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1972) (non-profit civic recreational organization
utilized city property and derived funds from the city and conducted recreational programs).
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with, 206 encouraged,20 or benefited 208 from the private party's actions,
then the conduct will be considered state action within the ambit of the
constitutional protection provided by the equal protection clause. The
Supreme Court has said, however, that the mere conferring of a license
to a private entity does not constitute sufficient state involvement to
hold the private actor accountable. 209 Nor does the mere fact that a
private business is subject to state regulation by itself convert its action
into that of the state. 210 Although each situation will be judged inde-
pendently, the Court will insist that the alleged discriminatory conduct
come from a person for whom the state is responsible because the
actions are otherwise chargeable to the state. 211
An illustration of such a "symbiotic relationship"212 which would
constitute state action against an Acadian discriminatee might be as
follows: A municipality in poor financial straits contracts for the services
of a proven financial analyst who specializes in restructuring local gov-
ernments' economic budgets and who employs a total of fourteen em-
ployees. The stricken municipality and the analyst form a relationship
But cf. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 98 S. Ct. 1729 (1978) (resolution of private
disputes delegated to warehousemen not considered a public function); Blum v. Yaretsky,
457 U.S. 991, 102 S. Ct. 2777 (1982) (operation of private nursing home and making patient
care decisions not a public function); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 102 S. Ct. 2764
(1981) (private school whose income is primarily channeled by public grants not a public
function).
206. E.g., Lugar, 457 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 2744 (where county clerk and sheriff acted
in concert with private entity in obtaining an attachment of petitioner's property, there existed
a "joint participation" and hence state action).
207. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 87 S. Ct. 1627 (1967) (state action where state
voters amended their constitution to provide for racial discrimination and courts enforced
its measures).
208. Burton, 365 U.S. 715, 81 S. Ct. 856 (1961) (State action was present where a pri-
vately-owned and operated restaurant which leased its space in a publicly-owned building
from the city parking authority refused to serve black customers. The Court concluded that
the Authority had placed "its power, property and prestige" behind the restaurant's dis-
crimination and had become a joint participant in the discrimination. Id. at 725, 81 S. Ct.
at 862); Hammond v. University of Tampa, 344 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1965) (state action present
in the admissions practice of a private university established largely through the use of surplus
city buildings and other city land).
209. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 92 S. Ct. 1965 (1972) (no state action
where state granted liquor license to private club which refused service to a black guest of
a member, even where the number of licenses was limited); accord Whitten v. Petroleum
Club, 508 F. Supp. 765 (W.D. La. 1981).
210. E.g., Blum, 457 U.S. 991, 1004, 102 S. Ct. 2777, 2786; Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350, 95 S. Ct. 449, 453 (1974).
211. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937-38, 102 S. Ct. at 2754.
212. The "symbiotic relationship" theory governs cases in which the government has
"so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence (with a private entity] that it
must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity." Burton, 365 U.S. at
725, 81 S. Ct. at 862 (1961).
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of near interdependence to combat the economic plight of the city. If,
during the contract period, the analyst would unjustly and invidiously
fire one of his Acadian employees merely because of his loathe for
Acadians as a class, a strong argument could be waged by the Acadian
that his former employer violated the equal protection clause. Under
these hypothetical circumstances, the mutual benefits conferred on both
the municipality and the private actor, and the extensive interrelation
involved, may very well support the conclusion that actions of the analyst
should be imputed to the state for purposes of Fourteenth Amendment
analysis. It should be noted that the Acadian victim would be remediless
under Title VII because his employer had less than fifteen employees.
In addition, he arguably would not be covered under Section 1981.
Hence, without analyzing the possibilities of a claim under private tort
law, the equal protection clause would provide his only remedy.
2. The "Purposeful Discrimination" requirement
In Washington v. Davis,213 the Supreme Court reiterated the basic
equal protection principle which has existed for over a century. The
Court reconfirmed that "the invidious quality of a law claimed to be
racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discrimi-
natory purpose. ' ' 21 4 Governmental action is not unconstitutional "solely
because it has a racially [or ethnically] disproportionate impact"; 21 1 in
order to subject a classification to strict scrutiny, it must be shown that
the governmental rule had for its purpose an intent to discriminate
against the disfavored group. Requiring proof'16 that particular govern-
mental action constitutes a purposeful device to classify persons on a
suspect criterion contrasts sharply with the "adverse impact" theory
established under Title VII, under which a court may focus upon the
effects of an alleged discriminatory practice rather than on the employer's
motivation or intent. 2 7 If a law or governmental policy on its face, 218
in its application, 2 9 or "in reality"2 0 classifies persons on the basis of
race or national origin, the measure will be subjected to strict scrutiny.
213. 426 U.S. 229, 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976).
214. Id. at 240, 96 S. Ct. at 2048.
215. Id. at 239, 96 S. Ct. at 2047 (emphasis by the court).
216. See text accompanying 'supra notes 72-88.
217. In Washington, the Court said: "We have never held that the Constitutional stand-
ard for adjudicating claims of invidious racial discrimination is identical to the standards
applicable under Title VII, and we decline to do so today." 426 U.S. at 238-39, 96 S. Ct.
at 2046-47.
218. See, e.g., Strauder, 100 U.S. 303.
219. See, e.g., Yick Wo, 11I U.S. 356, 6 S. Ct. 1064.
220. See, e.g., Rogers, 458 U.S. 613, 102 S. Ct. 3272 (1982).
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Nevertheless, the petitioner still bears the burden of proving that there
was a discriminatory purpose for the improper classification.
In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Develop-
ment Corp.,22l the Court delineated those factors which may be used
to determine whether an invidious discriminatory purpose is a motivating
factor in a governmental classification. Such factors include dispropor-
tionate impact, the historical background of the challenged decision, the
specific antecedent events, departures from normal procedures, and con-
temporary statements of the decisionmakers.
2 2 2
IV. ACADIANS' RIGHTS TO INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY AND CULTURAL
PRESERVATION UNDER THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTION OF 1974
A. The Right to Individual Dignity
The Louisiana constitutional provision corresponding to the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent
part:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. No
law shall discriminate against a person because of race or re-
ligious ideas, beliefs, or affiliations. No law shall arbitrarily,
capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate against a person be-
cause of birth, age, sex, culture, physical conditions, or political
ideas or affiliations. 223
The Louisiana Constitution of 1921 had no such equal protection clause.
As one commentator has said, "Louisiana's statement of the equal
protection guarantee moves the state from a position of having no equal
protection clause in its constitution to that of going beyond the decisional
law construing the Fourteenth Amendment.
224
The delegates to the constitutional convention at which the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974 was drafted intended to provide for a bifurcated
system of constitutional analysis with respect to certain legislative clas-
sifications. To wit, the delegates set forth a rule that there is absolutely
no justifiable reason for the state to discriminate against an individual
on the basis of race or religion. In reference to the non-exclusive 22
221. 429 U.S. 252, 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977).
222. Id. at 266-70, 97 S. Ct. at 564; For a comprehensive discussion of the problems
associated with "discriminatory purpose," see Gates, The Supreme Court and the Debate
over Discriminatory Purpose and Disproportionate Impact, 26 Loy. L. Rev. 567 (1980).
223. La. Const. art. I, § 3 (emphasis added).
224. Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35 La.
L. Rev. 1 (1974).
225. See id. at 7 ("The decision to list specific grounds, however, does not mean the
listing is exclusive, for the first sentence provides the general rule, 'no person shall be denied
the equal protection of the laws').
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classifications found in the third sentence of Article I section 3, such
as culture or sex, the state may discriminate against these groups only
if the governmental action is not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
To illustrate this point, Delegate Dennery stated:
The authors believe that there is absolutely no basis for any
discrimination of any sort on the basis of, on account of race
or religion, but they do believe that there can be discrimination
if it is not arbitrary, not capricious, and not unreasonable as
far as the other items contained in the original committee report
are concerned. With the question of birth and age, for instance,
a reasonable discrimination is understandable because of drivers'
licenses, for example, or for retirement purposes. . . . Culture
is obvious. There can be certain reasonable discriminations there.
For instance, the English language can be the official language
of the state, and therefore, that is a reasonable discrimination
against the French language.22 6
Delegate Chris Roy of Marksville expressed the Convention's intent
in providing for the specific enumerated categories when he said:
We feel that we have to enumerate these various rights because
we think that our citizens are entitled to have our court protect
them in the future. It's been too many times that even the
Supreme Court of the United States has dodged the issue with
respect to equal protection. We want to make sure that our
justices can clearly understand that when you're going to dis-
criminate, when the state will discriminate against a person for
any one of these categories, then the state must show a rea-
sonable basis for it.227
Therefore, when the state classifies individuals on the basis of an Article
I, section 3 enumerated constitutional classification, such as culture, the
state is assigned the burden of justifying such a classification by showing
that it substantially furthers a legitimate state purpose and is not ar-
bitrary, capricious or unreasonable. 28
226. State of Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973 Verbatim Transcripts, Vol.
XII, Aug. 30, 1973 at 3 (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as Proceedings].
227. Id. at 61.
228. See Sibley v. Board of Supervisors, 477 So. 2d 1094 (La. 1985) (on reh'g). In Sibley,
on rehearing, four members of the supreme court held that under the Louisiana Constitution,
legislative classifications based on race and religious beliefs are banned absolutely, and that
legislative classifications based on birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, political ideas
or affiliations are permitted if the state can show that the classification is not arbitrary,
capricious or unreasonable. At issue in Sibley was whether the Medical Malpractice Act,
which prohibited malpractice judgments against the state in excess of $500,000, classified
individuals because of their physical condition. See also Proceedings, supra note 226, at 62.
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The inclusion of culture as a specially enumerated classification came
about as the result of demands made by certain Louisiana Francophile
groups, such as CODOFIL, interested in protecting the Louisiana French
heritage and the continued use of the French language. 229 The original
proposal referred to "social origin," but was later amended to "culture"
in deference to the strong interest in preserving the French influence in
Louisiana. 2 0
B. The Right to Cultural Preservation
1. Discrimination Against Acadians Under the Early Louisiana
Constitutions
As was discussed in the preface of this comment, the Acadian people
experienced a history of invidious ethnic discrimination as they made
their way to the United States and Louisiana. The discrimination con-
tinued as the Acadians attempted to maintain their culture and language
in a country attempting to assimilate all of its citizens into a conformist
Anglo-American way of life. Although the Acadians never "melted"
into Anglo-America as expected, the barriers set forth severely hampered
the preservation of their culture and language. The discrimination, how-
ever, was not limited to the private sector; the state of Louisiana
contributed heavily to the woes of the Acadian people. This subsection
will analyze the official assimilation process directed primarily against
the Acadians as set forth under the public education provisions in
Louisiana Constitutions from 1864 to 1921.
The first three Louisiana constitutions of 1812, 1845, and 1852
contained no requirements that courses in public schools be conducted
solely in the English language; educators in the Acadian parishes were
free to conduct their classes in French. In 1864, however, after the
defeat of the Confederate forces in the Civil War, Louisiana was forced
to revise its constitution. A new political element emerged during Re-
construction which was reflected in the Louisiana constitution.
Under the 1864 constitution,23 ' it became unconstitutional to conduct
courses in public schools in any language other than English. The
Reconstruction Constitution provided: "The general exercises in the com-
mon schools shall be conducted in the English language." '232 The con-
stitution of 1868 reaffirmed this order.
The Louisiana Constitution was again revised in 1879, and a major
change occurred, allowing some autonomy to educators in conducting
229. See Proceedings, supra note 226, at 3; see also Hargrave, supra note 224, at 9 n.37.
230. See Proceedings, supra note 226, at 3; see also Hargrave, supra note 224, at 9 n.37.
231. La. Const. 1864. Often referred to as the "Reconstruction Constitution."
232. La. Const. Title XI, art. 142 (1984) (emphasis added).
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language procedures in their classrooms. The constitution of 1879 pro-
vided:
The general exercises in the public schools shall be conducted
in the English language and the elementary branches taught
therein; provided, that these elementary branches may be also
taught in the French language in those parishes in the State or
localities in said parishes where the French language predomi-
nates, if no additional expense is incurred thereby. 233
In 1898, the constitution expanded the French language provisions to
apply to all grades, not just the elementary classes, in the Acadian
parishes .234
Nevertheless, in 1921, during the midst of the "melting pot" re-
surgence, the state constitution reverted back to its Reconstruction era
position on language in the classrooms. The 1921 constitution provided:
"The general exercises in the public schools shall be conducted in the
English language." 2" Cultural and linguistic ignorance would reign under
the State Constitution for another 53 years.
2. An Opportunity for Cultural Progress-The Louisiana
Constitution of 1974
Significant measures were taken in Louisiana before the adoption
of the 1974 constitution to preserve and maintain the Acadian culture
and the French language. In 1968, CODOFIL was established as an
official state agency216 empowered to develop, utilize, and preserve the
French heritage and language in Louisiana. Enabling legislation required
that the French language and the culture and the history of the Acadian
people be taught for a sequence of years in the public school systems
of the state. 237
The cultural renaissance, however, would not succeed overnight. The
historical stigma associated with speaking French and living the Acadian
life was still ingrained in many Acadians. Ironically, in some parishes
the institution of French programs was encumbered by Acadian members
of the local school boards. In hindsight, one can understand the ap-
prehension felt by many of these politicians; the guilt and shame imposed
upon these people would not wash away overnight. Nevertheless, many
Francophiles in Louisiana felt it necessary to push forward for a con-
stitutional mandate to preserve the Acadian and French culture in Lou-
isiana.
233. La. Const. art. 226 (1879).
234. See La. Const. art. 251 (1898).
235. La. Const. art. 12, § 12 (1921).
236. La. R.S. 25:651-53 (1975).
237. La. R.S. 17:272 (1982).
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Article XII, section 4 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 provides
that "[tihe right of the people to preserve, foster, and promote their
respective historic linguistic and cultural origins is recognized." The
preservation of the Acadian culture and French language was the catalyst
to the section's adoption:
Proponents of the section were primarily Francophones con-
cerned with the protection of the French Acadian culture. Rep-
resentatives of the Council for the Development of French in
Louisiana appeared before the committee several times to urge
some recognition of cultural rights . . . . Although the ultimate
wording is much broader and although one staff research mem-
orandum suggested that preservation of black culture would also
be protected by such a proposal, the preservation of French
culture was the driving force. 21
The practical effects of the section were adequately expressed in a
research staff memorandum:
As Judge Babineaux of Lafayette stated in his letter of April
16, 1973, to committee members in support of the proposed
section, its adoption would not mean the wholesale replacement
of English by French in the parishes of Acadiana. It would only
mean that some courses might be taught in French in some
parishes depending upon the wishes of the people as expressed
through their local school boards. As a practical matter, English
will continue to be the dominant language in the state. It would
merely provide greater freedom in the use of other languages.
The 1921 Louisiana Constitution, Article XII, section 12, pro-
hibits this. 239
Again, the popular approval of this constitutional provision reflected
the thoughts and beliefs of the people of Louisiana that they would
not tolerate another attempt to write off cultural growth and preservation
in the name of national homogenization.
It is interesting to note that any legislative provision which prohibits
the teaching of any subject in any language other than English or that
prohibits the teaching of foreign languages was declared unconstitutional
by the United States Supreme Court in 1923. In Meyer v. Nebraska,241
the Court struck down such a statute as an arbitrary exercise of the
state's police power and an unreasonable infringement of the liberty
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 24'
238. Hargrave, "Statutory" and "Horatory" Provisions of the Louisiana Constitution
of 1974, 43 La. L. Rev. 647, 682 (1983).
239. CBRE Staff Memo No. 31, May 2, 1973 at X Records: Committee Documents 110.
240. 262 U.S. 390, 43 S. Ct. 625 (1923).
241. Id. at 403, 43 S. Ct. at 628.
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As indicated earlier, several local school boards elected not to in-
stitute the teaching of a second language in the public school curriculums.
To overcome this hurdle, by Act 714 of 1975,24 the legislature set forth
a procedure whereby the heads of the households in a local school board
jurisdiction may compel their board to implement such a program in
the public school curriculum when the board has failed to act.243 By
this legislation, if a petition containing the names of at least twenty-
five percent of the heads of households of students attending a particular
school within a school board jurisdiction is presented to the local su-
perintendent, the board is under a statutory obligation to implement
the second language program within that school's curriculum.
In Faul v. Superintendent of Education,2" the third circuit upheld
the constitutionality of this statute. The court held, inter alia, that the
statute was not unconstitutional as enabling a minority to control a
majority, nor inoperable as an usurpation of powers delegated to a local
school board. A
Conclusion
Le titre VII de la loi de 1964 (Civil Rights Act of 1964) avait pour
but de supprimer sur les lieux de travail toute discrimination bas~e sur
la race et la lign~e. L'analyse des travaux pr6paratoires de la loi ainsi
que les interpretations jurisprudentielles et administratives font apparaitre
qu'un Acadien d'origine peut se pr6valoir de la protection de cette loi.
Ainsi concluait le juge Hunter dans l'arr& Roach:2 46
[T]he Louisiana Acadian is alive and well. He is 'upfront'
and 'main stream'. He is not asking for any special treatments.
By affording coverage under the 'national origin' clause of Title
VII he is afforded no special privilege. He is given only the
same protection as those with English, Spanish, French, Iranian,
242. La. R.S. 17:273 (1982).
243. The statute provides in pertinent part:
B. (1) If a parish or city school board does not establish a second language
program by May 30, 1976, such a program shall be required upon presentation
of a petition requesting the instruction of a particular second language .... It
shall contain the signatures of at least twenty-five percent of the heads of house-
holds of students attending a particular school within the jurisdiction of the parish
or city school board.
(2) Upon receiving a certified petition, the parish or city school board shall
establish the teaching of the designated second language ....
(4) The cost of implementing [such a program] will be borne by the local school
system.
244. 367 So. 2d 1267 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
245. Id. at 1271-73.
246. 494 F. Supp. 215.
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Czechoslavakian, Portuguese, Polish, Mexican, Italian, Irish, et
al. ancestors.
2 4
'
Les travaux pr~paratoires de la section 1981 de la loi, r6v~lent que
le 16gislateur ne jamais eu l'intention de limiter son application au seul
critre de la race. Consid~rant I'ambiguit6 du terme "race" et les resultats
disparates auxquels son interpretations a aboute, il convient, en effet,
d'inclure dans ia loi toute personne appartenant A une ethnie identifiable
et discrimin6e sur cette base. Tout traitement discriminatoire et inten-
tionnel, A l'encontre des Acadiens, lorsqu'il est le fait d'un employeur
i6 directement ou indirectement a' l'ttat, doit etre consid6r6 comme
une violation de I.'Equal Protection Clause" du XIV~me Amendment
de la Constitution des 2tats Unis d'Amerique.
Affin d'effacer des m6moires les traitements du passe, ia Constitution
de la Louisiane de 'an mille neuf cent soixante quatorze, proclame le
droit a l'identite culturelle de l'individu et des ethnies. Vive les Aca-
diens! 24
James Harvey Domengeaux
247. Id. at 218.
248. The English translation of the conclusion is as follows: The taint of disparate treat-
ment in the workplace directed against an individual on the basis of immutable characteristics
such as race and ancestry is precisely what Title VII sought to eradicate when it was enacted
in 1964. An analysis of the Act's legislative history, and the jurisprudential and administrative
interpretations thereof, makes certain that a native-born Acadian is entitled to. its protection.
As Judge Hunter concluded in Roach: "...." The legislative history of § 1981 reveals that
the authors never intended to limit its coverage to "racial" classifications. In view of the
ambiguous notion of "race" and the anomalous results reached when narrowly construing
the provision on this basis, individuals who can lay claim to an "identifiable national origin
group" and are discriminated against on this basis should be included within the encom-
passment of the Act. Intentionally discriminatory actions directly or indirectly linked to the
state should be considered a violation of the equal protection clause. To eradicate past acts
of official class based discrimination, the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 has provided in
its charter for protection of cultural preservation and individual dignity. Long live the Aca-
dians!
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